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Financialisation and real investment in the European Union using a 
country-level analysis: beneficial or prejudicial effects?1 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper makes an empirical assessment of the relationship between financialisation and real 
investment by non-financial corporations using panel data composed of 27 European Union 
countries over 19 years (from 1995 to 2013). On one hand, financialisation leads to a rise in 
financial investments, deviating funds from real investments (“crowding out” effect). On the 
other, pressures from shareholders to intensify financial payments restrict the funds available for 
new real investments. We estimate an aggregate investment equation with the traditional 
variables (profitability, debt, cost of capital, savings rate and output growth) and two further 
measures of financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). Findings show that 
financialisation has damaged real investment in European Union countries, mainly through the 
channel of financial payments either in interest or dividend payments. It is also found that the 
prejudicial effects of financialisation in investment are more marked in more financialised 
countries. In addition, it is concluded that debt has a harmful effect on real investment as the 
increasing levels of non-financial corporations' indebtedness prevent the use of new debts to 
finance real investments.   
 
KEYWORDS  
Financialisation, Investment, The European Union, Panel Data, Driscoll and Kraay Estimator 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION 
C23, D20, E22 and E44 
 
                                                          
1 The author is grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee, Luís 
Martins, Marta Silva, Ricardo Correia, Sérgio Lagoa and Sofia Vale. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Conventional economic theory finds that the growth of finance fosters economic growth due to 
the positive association between savings and investments (e. g. Levine, 2005). Nevertheless, 
scholars of financialisation (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; Hein and van Treeck, 2010; Hein, 
2012; Hein and Dodig, 2015; among others) postulates that the increasing growth of finance 
harms the real investment of non-financial corporations (NFCs) through two channels. The first 
channel involves the NFCs’ greater engagement in financial activities, which tends to divert 
funds from real investments (“crowding out” effect). The second is caused by the strong 
pressures on NFCs to increase their financial payments (interest, dividends and/or stocks 
buybacks) to the financial markets and respective shareholders, which leads to lower retention 
ratios and fewer funds for long-term productive projects.  
In light of this, some empirical studies have been conducted in recent years to assess the 
relationship between financialisation and real investment. Most of these derive and estimate 
investment equations that find statistical evidence of the prejudicial effects of the phenomenon 
on real investment (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; van Treeck, 2008; 
Onaran et al., 2011; Barradas and Lagoa, 2014).  
This paper examines the impact of financialisation on the real investment of NFCs in 
European Union (EU) countries between 1995 and 2013, contributing to the literature in two 
ways. First, it focuses on EU countries, whereas most studies are oriented to the specificities of 
large, highly developed and financialised countries like the USA or the UK. Second, a panel 
data econometric analysis is used rather than the time series econometric analysis more usual in 
empirical studies on this matter. This allows us to understand whether the prejudicial effects of 
financialisation have been generalised and transversal to a large set of countries or, 
alternatively, specific to certain countries. The use of a panel data econometric analysis also 
permits a larger number of observations and sample variability and thus improves the accuracy 
of estimates.  
EU countries represent an interesting case study as they share common economic rules 
because they belong to the same economic and political region. However, these countries have 
some diversity in terms of financialisation due to their different types of financial system 
(“bank-based” or “market based” in the typology of Sawyer (2013)) and distinct growth models 
in the era of financialisation (“debt-led consumption boom”, “domestic demand-led” and 
“export-led mercantilist” in the classification of Hein (2012)). These dissimilarities could 
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explain the differences in the countries’ levels of financialisation (Table A5 and Table A6 in 
Appendix). Despite this heterogeneity, there has been a downward trend in the investment rate 
in most of these countries (Figure A1 in Appendix), simultaneously with a rise in financial 
receipts and financial payments (Figure A7 and Figure A8 in Appendix). It is therefore 
interesting to determine whether there is a disruptive relationship between financialisation and 
real investment. 
Accordingly, we estimate an investment equation using standard variables (profitability, 
debt, cost of capital, savings rate and the output growth) and two additional variables linked to 
financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). We estimate an aggregate 
investment function given our interest in studying a macroeconomic issue. 
It is concluded that financialisation exerts a negative influence on the real investment of 
EU countries, mainly through the second channel (either interest or dividends payments). This 
confirms our suspicion that the disruptive relationship between financialisation and real 
investment is a generalised phenomenon with a negative effect on EU countries from a 
macroeconomic point of view. However, we also conclude that the harmful effects of 
financialisation on real investment are greater in more financialised countries than in less 
financialised ones. It is also found that debt has a negative influence on real investment, which 
indicates that the higher debt levels of NFCs prevent them from obtaining new debts to finance 
productive investments.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between financialisation and real 
investment of NFCs. An investment equation is built in Section 3. The data and the econometric 
methodology are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main findings and the respective 
discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIALISATION AND REAL 
INVESTMENT 
 
It is generally accepted that higher rates of physical capital accumulation are crucial to sustain 
more dynamic economic growth and employment creation. Conventional economic theory 
advocates that the growth of finance is generally a positive phenomenon that supports the real 
investments of NFCs given the linkage between savings and investments. This idea has been 
reinforced by some empirical studies, which find a positive relationship between the growth of 
finance and economic growth (Levine, 2005; Ang, 2008; Arestis et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless and according to the literature on financialisation, the growth of finance 
can be prejudicial to the real investments of NFCs through two distinct channels and it is 
theoretically discussed by Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b), Hein and van Treeck (2010), Hein 
(2012), Hein and Dodig (2015), among others. Figure 1 exhibits the channels (and factors that 
contribute to feed each of them) associated to the effects of financialisation on real investment. 
 
Figure 1 – The channels associated to the prejudicial effects of financialisation on real investment 
Slowdown of real investment 
Involvement in financial activities 
(more financial receipts) 
Shorter planning horizons 
More concerns about profits 
Falling profits in the real sector 
Increasing external funding costs 
Macroeconomic uncertainty 
Changes in corporate governance 
Mimetic behaviour 
Institutional transmission 
  
Lower retention ratios 
(more financial payments) 
High levels of indebtedness 
Profit-based remunerations 
Importance of institutional investors 
“Shareholder value orientation” 
Source: Authors’ representation based on Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b), Hein and van Treeck (2010), 
Hein (2012), Hein and Dodig (2015), among others 
 
 
The first channel involves NFCs’ increasing investments in financial activities and financial 
assets, which takes funds from real and productive activities. This is labelled by Hein (2012) 
and Hein and Dodig (2015) as the “management’s preference channel”. As both external and 
internal funds are limited, NFCs can only use these funds to invest in financial or real activities, 
since financial investments and real investments are considered perfect substitutes (Tobin, 
1965). Thus, NFCs have fewer funds for real and productive investments when they increase 
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their financial investments, and this is commonly referred to as the “crowding out effect” on real 
investment. 
Krippner (2005) confirms that NFCs in the USA have increased their involvement in 
financial investments, as revealed by the growing importance of financial revenues and profits 
vis-à-vis the revenues and profits from real investments. Similarly, Cingolani (2013) argues that 
this behaviour expresses a higher accumulation of financial rents to the detriment of productive 
accumulation. The literature on financialisation offers several explanations to describe this 
stance by NFCs.  
Firstly, Crotty (2005) advocates that the rise in financial investments (normally in the 
form of buying financial subsidiaries or expanding an already existing one) has been determined 
by NFCs’ shorter planning horizons that are incompatible with the pursuit of long-term real 
projects. This short-termism mirrors a tendency among investors to sacrifice long-term 
investment projects in order to increase short-term profits (Aspara et al., 2014). According to 
Samuel (2000), this focus on short-term profits instead of long-term expansion reflects a certain 
“managerial myopia”. 
Secondly, Crotty (1990) concludes that shareholders are more concerned about current 
profitability than long-term expansion or, ultimately, the corporations’ actual survival. 
Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) stresses the strong pressures (essentially exerted by shareholders) 
on managers to achieve higher short-term returns. These pressures encourage financial 
investments, which tend to produce larger and more speculative short-term profits rather than 
real investments that normally involve more uncertainty and only produce profits in the medium 
and long-term. This is the so-called “rent-seeking behaviour” of NFCs. In fact, Hein (2012) and 
Hein and Dodig (2015) stress that NFCs face a “growth-profit trade-off” because shareholders’ 
orientations are mainly for short-term profitability. Once again, this discourages the 
implementation of real capital projects. Baud and Durand (2012) also state that NFCs intensify 
their financial investments during bull markets which produce higher levels of profits and 
respond to the pressures of shareholders. Levy-Orlik (2012) notes that NFCs sometimes 
repurchase their own shares in order to prevent hostile takeovers, which also leads to a rise in 
share prices and increases short-term profits. Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) even stress that 
managers’ performance is no longer evaluated on market share but on their ability to generate 
short-term profits and increased share prices. 
Thirdly, Crotty (2005) and Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) argue that NFCs may be 
engaging more in financial activities in reaction to the downward trend of profits from the real 
sector and the increase in external funding costs since the 1980s. Baud and Durand (2012) 
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confirm that US retailers’ involvement in financial activities is the result of the decline of 
profitable opportunities in real investments, motivated by the maturation of markets, low 
profitability rates, stricter regulations, sluggish consumer demand and increasing competition. 
Soener (2015) notes that this is the political economy perspective in which NFCs are becoming 
more financialised so as to remain viable. Crotty (2005) terms this the “neoliberal paradox”; he 
claims that shareholders tend to coerce NFCs to remain competitive and profitable even in 
downturn environments, thus inducing managers to move from productive to financial 
investments. According to Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), this behaviour reflects the NFCs 
strategy of “growth fast in a slow-growth economy”.  
Fourthly, Akkemik and Özen (2014) advocate that macroeconomic uncertainty and 
increased risks together with institutional changes in corporate governance are the main reasons 
behind the rise in financial investments by NFCs. They tested these hypotheses using a panel 
data econometric analysis for 41 corporations quoted in Istanbul Stock Exchange for the period 
between 1990 and 2002. However, they found that this channel is mainly determined by highly 
uncertain macroeconomic environments and by the characteristics of corporations (such as size), 
whilst institutional features (e.g. close ties with the government, family ownership, discretion of 
managerial power and unionisation) do not have a statistical significant impact on 
financialisation. In fact, Baud and Durand (2012) stress that there is a greater preference for 
liquid assets in business environments characterised by high levels of uncertainty as the 
financial investments of NFCs represent a kind of “wait-and-see” strategy. In turn, NFCs 
involve themselves in financial activities through financial instruments, which hedge several 
risks against uncertainty (Soener, 2015). 
Fifthly and following a neo-institutionalism perspective, Soener (2015) adds two further 
explanations to describe the growing importance of NFCs’ financial investments. First, he 
stresses that NFCs learn to financialise with other corporations, i.e. the so-called “mimetic 
behaviour”. Second, he emphasises that some actors (like financial executives or independent 
consultants) influence investors and managers to make more financial investments. Here, there 
is an institutional transmission of knowledge and practices from the know-how of these actors 
in the corporate finance field to the respective investors and managers. 
Nonetheless, some authors (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; and 
Ndikumana, 1999) emphasise that the increase in financial receipts due to investments in 
financial activities and financial assets could exert a positive influence on productive 
investments if (and when) NFCs channel these financial incomes to make real investments. 
Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) recognise that this could be a more relevant mechanism in the 
 Financialisation and real investment in the European Union using a country-level analysis: 
beneficial or prejudicial effects? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
8 
 
case of small and medium corporations since they face higher financial constrains and are 
therefore forced to use all incomes (even financial) to undertake real investments. However, the 
financialisation literature does not support this mechanism but argues that these financial 
incomes are normally re-invested in other financial activities and financial assets.  
The second channel is associated with the strong pressures on NFCs to increase their 
financial payments (interest, dividends and/or stocks buybacks) to the financial markets and the 
respective shareholders. This limits the funds available for real investments, which is commonly 
referred to as the “profit without investment” hypothesis (Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 2014). 
As noted by Aglietta and Breton (2001) and Duménil and Lévy (2004), the higher levels of 
payout ratios reduce the funds available for real investments made by NFCs, which has had a 
negative effect on the execution of long-term investment projects including activities like 
innovation, research and development. Hein (2012) and Hein and Dodig (2015) term this the 
“internal means of finance channel”. Once again, the literature on financialisation presents 
several explanations for the low retention ratios of NFCs. 
Firstly, Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) focuses on the high levels of NFCs indebtedness, 
which lead to a rise in financial payments in the form of interest.  
Secondly and regarding the financial payments through dividends, he notes that 
managers are encouraged to raise short-term payout ratios and in fact it is in their interest to do 
so as their remuneration is based on the short-term evolution of stock prices. Their strategy is 
therefore to distribute high dividends because this tends to drive a short-term increase in stock 
prices. On the other hand, this is simply a response to pressures from shareholders who, in some 
cases, are institutional investors that seek constant appreciations in stock value and high payout 
ratios. If NFCs do not make these financial payments in the form of dividends, their stocks 
could decline sharply as demand for them would fall and supply increase, which could 
ultimately lead to a takeover.  
 Thirdly, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Stockhammer (2010) argue that this 
growing trend of financial payments by NFCs over the last three decades is associated with a 
new design of corporate governance that favours the maximisation of shareholder value: the so-
called “shareholder value orientation”. Aglietta (2000) and van der Zwan (2014) notes that this 
has become “the norm of the transformation of capitalism” and is responsible for the 
dissemination of policies and practices that tend to favour shareholders over the other 
constituents of corporations. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) suggest there has been a shift 
from “retain and reinvest” to a “downsize and distribute” strategy, namely a transfer from a 
strategy oriented to profit retention and reinvestment in corporations’ growth to one of 
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downsizing of corporate labour forces and the distribution of profits to shareholders. Levy-Orlik 
(2012) emphasises that investors’ decisions based exclusively on the aim to maximise 
shareholder value target the reduction of production costs and rise in stock prices, to the 
detriment of employment, income equality, innovation and industrialisation. 
Conversely and as referred by Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b), some authors claim that 
the increase in financial payments could be positive for NFCs’ real investment on the grounds 
that higher levels of financial payments depend on higher profits and solvency. As such, these 
corporations will probably have access to more funding at lower costs, which could increase the 
implementation of new productive investments. However, this is not supported in the 
financialisation literature, which states that pressures to raise short-term financial payments are 
so strong and constant that NFCs cannot implement new real investments.  
Despite the growing body of theoretical work on the effects of financialisation on real 
investment, there are few empirical studies on the subject, as emphasised by Onaran et al. 
(2011). Nevertheless, some empirical studies estimate investment functions for several countries 
in order to make an econometric analysis of financialisation’s impact on real investment; most 
of these find it to be harmful
2
.  
Stockhammer (2004) estimates an investment equation for Germany, France, UK and 
USA, using a time series econometric analysis for each country individually. He uses interest 
and dividends received (the so-called rentier income) by NFCs to measure financialisation, and 
concludes that it has led to a deceleration in real investment, particularly in the USA, France and 
UK. Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) also identifies the deleterious effect of financialisation in the 
USA. He conducts a time series econometric analysis using aggregate data for NFCs as a whole 
and a panel data econometric analysis using micro data, analysing by sector (manufacturing 
versus non-manufacturing corporations), industry (durable versus non-durable producers) and 
dimension (small versus large corporations). In both studies, he applies financial profits (interest 
and dividends) and financial payments (interest, dividends and stock buybacks) to measure the 
two channels of financialisation. Van Treeck (2008) also performs a time series econometric 
analysis for the USA for the period between 1965 and 2004. He concludes that interest and 
dividend payments exert a negative influence on long-term non-financial investment in the 
USA. Onaran et al. (2011) estimate a simpler investment function, using a time series 
econometric analysis for the USA from 1962 to 2007. They found evidence supporting the 
                                                          
2 As demonstrated by Onaran et al. (2011) there are also some theoretical and empirical studies on the 
effects of financialisation in the other components of the aggregate demand. Here, we focus only on 
investment. 
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claims that financialisation (proxied by interest and dividends payments) has suppressed the 
level of investment. Barradas and Lagoa (2014) also perform a time series econometric analysis 
focused on Portugal from 1977 and 2013, using a Vector Error Correction Model and financial 
receipts and financial profits of NFCs as proxies to capture financialisation. They conclude that 
financialisation has hurt real investment, mainly through financial payments and particularly in 
the long-term.   
The literature has focused mainly on large and highly developed counties through time 
series econometric analyses for those countries. Here, we aim to make an empirical assessment 
of the relationship between financialisation and real investment of NFCs using a large set of 
countries, EU countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper conducting a panel 
data econometric analysis for a group of countries over time. This approach will allow us to 
perceive if the prejudicial effects of financialisation have been generalised and transversal to 
this large set of countries or only affected specific countries from a macroeconomic view point
3
. 
 
3. FINANCIALISATION AND REAL INVESTMENT: AN ECONOMIC 
MODELISATION 
 
Empirical studies of real investment are particularly difficult when they are carried out through 
econometric estimations of investment functions (Eisner, 1974). Effectively, “[…] estimation of 
investment functions is a tricky and difficult business and the best posture for any of us in that 
game is one of humility” (Eisner, 1974, p. 101). In the same vein, Davidson (2000) emphasises 
that investment equations do not follow a stable functional expression over time, since 
investment decisions are constantly affected by exogenous “animal spirits” of investors. 
Nevertheless, there are several empirical studies of real investment in the literature that 
reveal various determinants of investment decisions. Stockhammer (2004) stresses the capacity 
utilisation, profitability and cost of capital as the main determinants of investment, while 
Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) highlights real and financial variables, namely the level of 
profitability, output (or sales), cost of capital (or interest rates), degree of indebtedness and 
cash-flow (or the internal funds). Similarly, van Treeck (2008) states that the level of 
profitability and the business cycle are the main influencers of investment and Onaran et al. 
                                                          
3 From an econometric view point, the panel data econometric analysis has several other advantages over 
a simple time series econometric analysis, as pointed out by Baltagi (2005), Brooks (2008), among others. 
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(2001) refers to output (that captures the accelerator effect) and the level of profitability (that 
indicates the availability of funds) as particularly influential.  
In what follows, we estimate an equation where investment is a function of the 
prevalent variables in the explanation of investment decisions of investors in NFCs: 
profitability, level of debt, cost of capital, savings rate and output growth. Additionally, we 
incorporate two further variables (financial receipts and financial payments) to account for the 
two channels related with financialisation’s prejudicial effects on productive investments, as 
described previously. 
Accordingly, our investment function takes the following form: 
    
(1) 
 
 , where i  is the country, t  is the time period (years), I  is investment of NFCs, P  is 
profitability of NFCs, D  is the corporate debt of NFCs, CC  is the cost of capital, SR  is the 
savings rate, OG  is the output growth, FR  are financial receipts of NFCs and FP  are 
financial payments of NFCs. 
The two-way error term component is given by: 
 
 (2) 
 
, where i  accounts for unobservable country-specific effects and t  accounts for time-
specific effects. The term t,i  is the random disturbance in the regression, varying across 
countries and years. 
We use lagged values for the independent variables because of the time lag between 
investment decisions and the respective capital expenditures (investment projects usually take 
over one year to be implemented, meaning that the decision to invest in t  was based with 
information in 1t  ), the role on the formation of investors’ expectations (adaptive 
expectations) and the need to avoid potential problems of simultaneity and reverse causation 
(i.e. endogeneity problems) (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). On one hand, profits (where 
financial receipts and financial payments are included) of a certain year are only available for 
investments in the following year. On the other, investors only know the lagged values of output 
growth when they make investment decisions. 
  1,41,31,21,10, tititititi SRCCDPI 
t,itit,i  
t,i1t,i71t,i61t,i5 FPFROG   
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All NFCs variables (investment, profitability, debt, financial receipts and financial payments) 
are expressed as ratios of the respective gross value added (both the numerator and denominator 
are in volume). This permits the comparison of variables expressed in different currencies, 
making exchange rates unnecessary for conversion to the same currency that could skew results 
due to the respective movements on international financial markets. This also allows the 
respective coefficients to be interpreted in percentage points (p.p.). 
It should be noted that we propose to estimate an aggregate investment function, 
similarly to Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008a), van Treeck (2008), Onaran et al. (2011) 
and Barradas and Lagoa (2014). Stockhammer (2004) emphasises that the respective results 
should be analysed with care as we are addressing a macroeconomic issue, i.e. the slowdown of 
real investment, although the theory of NFCs investment decisions is supported by 
microeconomic fundaments. This strategy implies the assumption of a representative 
corporation. In addition, we recognise some limitations to this approach since the use of an 
aggregate investment function does not reflect different financialisation levels among NFCs or 
the potential dissimilarities in the behaviour of NFCs from different countries, sectors, 
industries, dimensions and/or ownerships. Note also that as a panel data econometric analysis 
estimates an average effect of several countries, it does not account for the historical, social and 
economic circumstances responsible for real investment in each country. Here, we follow a 
macroeconomic perspective to assess whether financialisation has been beneficial or prejudicial 
to real investment in the EU. Thus, if the two channels of financialisation are found to have a 
macroeconomic effect, we cannot determine whether it is due to the impact of some 
corporations/countries or is more generalised across all corporations/countries. If we do not find 
any macroeconomic effect, we cannot exclude that they affect a subset of 
corporations/countries, which however is not enough to create a macroeconomic effect in all 
countries. 
Accordingly, profitability, savings rate and output growth are expected to exert a 
positive influence on investment, while cost of capital and the two variables of financialisation 
are expected to influence NFCs investment negatively. The level of debt could have a positive 
or a negative influence on investment. Thus, coefficients of these variables are expected to have 
the following signs: 
 
 (3) 
 
 Financialisation and real investment in the European Union using a country-level analysis: 
beneficial or prejudicial effects? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
13 
 
Profitability is expected to exert a positive influence on real investment, mirroring the demand 
conditions that are crucial to determine the viability of investment projects. Effectively and 
following a Keynesian argument, profitability tends to have a positive effect on real investment 
by functioning as a source of internal funds (Stockhammer, 2004). Kopche and Braunman 
(2001) note that expectations for future demand conditions and future profitability have the 
strongest influence on investment. Nonetheless, Kuh and Meyer (1955) and Minsky (1975) state 
that given the uncertainty about the future it is the past demand conditions and past profitability 
rather than the expectations that are the major influencers of investment. This seems to prevent 
the anticipation of future demand conditions and future levels of profitably, in a context where 
these expectations are normally formed on the basis of past.  
The debt level has an undetermined effect on investment (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). 
A positive effect is expected when the debt level is perceived to be safe. Here, a rise in debt may 
have no effect or even a positive effect on investment by increasing the available funds. A 
negative effect occurs when the debt level is perceived to be unsafe, as it signals greater 
financial fragility and makes it more difficult to obtain further funding. In that situation, future 
profits may be insufficient to repay existing debt, increasing the probability of bankruptcy. 
The cost of capital (normally measured by the level of real long-term interest rates) is 
expected to exert a negative effect on real investment, reflecting the funding costs or the 
respective opportunity costs.   
In addition, real investment is expected to depend positively on the respective savings 
rate, because a higher savings rate tends to be associated with a higher level of funds in the 
hands of banks and/or international financial markets, which is determinant to their 
intermediation function and the provision of funding to corporations (by transferring savings 
from lenders to borrowers in credit or other forms of financing).  
 On the other hand, real investment also depends positively on the output growth. This 
follows the Keynesian argument of the accelerator principle that most investors exhibit a higher 
propensity to invest in periods of economic growth than during downturns. The accelerator 
principle postulates that an acceleration/deceleration of the GDP will accelerate/decelerate real 
investment even more, given a multiplier higher than one. Lopes (2003) confirms that real 
investment in the EU and the USA is strongly procyclical in relation to the respective business 
cycle. Indeed, Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) highlight the existence of two stylised facts 
of business cycles in relation to investment: investment is strongly positively correlated with the 
business cycle; and it is the most volatile component of aggregate demand.  
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Finally and as discussed in the previous Section, the two financialisation variables are expected 
to exert a negative influence on NFCs’ real investment. On one hand, the rise in financial 
receipts tends to lower real investment as NFCs will use this income to make further 
investments in financial activities and/or in financial assets rather than to investment in real 
activities (“crowding out” effect). On the other, financial payments also tend to lower real 
investment because they reduce the funds available for these real investments. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY: THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Data 
In order to analyse the role of financialisation on real investment of EU countries, we collect 
annual data from 1995 and 2013 for a set of 27 countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom). Malta was the only EU country excluded, due 
to the lack of data. Table 1 shows the sample period and the number of observations and 
missing per country.  
Table 1 – Sample composition 
Country Period Observations Missing 
Austria 1995-2013  19 0 
Belgium 1995-2013 19 0 
Bulgaria  2002-2012 11 8 
Cyprus 1997-2012 16 3 
Czech Republic  1995-2013 19 0 
Denmark 1995-2013 19 0 
Estonia 1996-2012 17 2 
Finland 1995-2012 18 1 
France 1995-2013 19 0 
Germany  1995-2013 19 0 
Greece  2005-2012 8 11 
Hungary 1995-2013 19 0 
Ireland 2002-2013 12 7 
Italy 1995-2013 19 0 
Latvia 1997-2013 17 2 
Lithuania 1999-2012 14 5 
Luxembourg 2006-2012 7 12 
Netherlands 1995-2013 19 0 
Norway 1995-2012 18 1 
Poland 1995-2012 18 1 
Portugal 1995-2013 19 0 
Romania 1995-2011 17 2 
Slovakia 1995-2013 19 0 
Slovenia 1998-2013 16 3 
Spain 2000-2013 14 5 
Sweden 1995-2013 19 0 
United Kingdom 1995-2013 19 0 
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This is the period and the frequency for which all data are available and they are suitable for the 
study for two reasons. First, financialisation became more preponderant in the 1990s (van der 
Zwan, 2014); second, the investment by corporations is a long-term decision (it usually takes 
over a year to implement investment projects and recover the invested capital), and therefore 
annual data is likely to capture the determinants of real investment better than higher frequency 
data. 
Thus, we construct a panel of data (or longitudinal data), since we collect data for a set 
of 27 cross-sectional units ( 27N  ) that were observed over time between 1995 and 2013         
( 19T  ). Nonetheless, we obtained an unbalanced panel data because it was impossible to 
collect data for all years for each country. We have 63 missing values and our sample is 
therefore composed of a total of 450 observations.  
Table A1 in Appendix contains the descriptive statistics of the data and Table 2 presents 
the corresponding correlation matrix between all variables. The most important finding is that 
the absolute values of all correlations are lower than 0.8, which is crucial to exclude the 
existence of severe multicollinearity between the variables of our model (Studenmund, 2005). 
In addition, profitability and output growth are the only variables positively correlated with 
investment; indeed they are precisely the two variables expected to have a positive effect on 
investment. The variables of debt, cost of capital, financial receipts and financial payments are 
negatively correlated with investment, which could signal a negative effect on investment. This 
also seems to confirm our suspicion that financialisation has hampered real investment through 
the two aforementioned channels.  
 
Table 2 – The correlation matrix between variables 
 I P D CC SR OG FR FP 
I 1        
P 0.139*** 1       
D -0.531*** 0.139*** 1      
CC -0.122*** -0.037 0.278*** 1     
SR -0.378*** -0.493*** -0.014 0.117** 1    
OG 0.313*** 0.151*** -0.327*** -0.311*** -0.234*** 1   
FR -0.288*** -0.323*** -0.016 -0.077 0.316*** -0.174*** 1  
FP -0.364*** 0.044 -0.102** -0.014 0.316*** -0.177*** 0.730*** 1 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
 
Regarding the definition of the data, we used the gross fixed capital formation of NFCs divided 
by the respective gross value added to describe the NFCs’ investment. The ratio between these 
two variables is usually known as the NFCs’ investment rate.  
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We use the NFCs’ gross operating surplus4 divided by the respective gross value added as a 
proxy of profitability; the ratio between these two variables is commonly referred to as the 
profit share of NFCs.  
The proxy of the debt level used here was the net lending/net borrowing
5
 of NFCs 
divided by the respective gross value added.  
Financial receipts correspond to the sum of interest and the distributed income of 
corporations
6
 (where dividends are included) received by NFCs. We divided them by the gross 
value added of NFCs.  
We use the sum of interest and the distributed income of corporations (where dividends 
are included) paid by NFCs as a proxy of financial payments. We also divided them by the 
gross value added of NFCs.  
Note that the variables of gross fixed capital formation, gross value added, gross 
operating surplus, net lending/net borrowing, financial receipts and financial payments of NFCs 
were collected from the European Sector Accounts (at current prices and in millions of national 
currency), available at Eurostat. When not available on Eurostat, observations of these variables 
were completed with data from the national statistic offices of each country. 
We use the long-term real interest rates (deflated by the GDP deflator) from AMECO 
database to measure the cost of capital of NFCs. For some countries, we also used the short-
term real interest rates (deflated by the GDP deflator) for several years because in the case of 
some countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) long-term real interest rates are only available for the most 
recent years
7
. We chose this strategy instead of using only the short-term real interest rates for 
all countries because investment is a long-term decision and is therefore more dependent on 
long-term interest rates. 
                                                          
4 According to the Eurostat, “gross operating surplus can be defined in the context of national accounts as 
a balancing item in the generation of income account representing the excess amount of money generated 
by incorporated enterprises' operating activities after paying labour input costs. In other words, it is the 
capital available to financial and non-financial corporations which allows them to repay their creditors, to 
pay taxes and eventually to finance all or part of their investment”. 
5 The net lending/net borrowing of non-financial corporations is the difference between current savings 
(plus capital transfers) and the respective investment. According to the OECD, “it reflects the amount of 
financial assets that are available for lending or needed for borrowing to finance all expenditures – 
current, gross capital formation, non-produced non-financial assets, and capital transfers – in excess of 
disposable income”. As such, a country is net lender/net borrower when it exhibits positive/negative 
values of net lending/net borrowing. 
6 The distributed income of corporations includes dividends and withdrawals from the income of quasi-
corporations (amounts that entrepreneurs withdraw for their own use from the profits earned by the 
quasi-corporations that belong to them). 
7 According to the AMECO database, the real interest rates are obtained by the difference between the 
nominal interest rates and the inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator. 
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The savings rate variable corresponds to the gross savings of households as a percentage of the 
respective disposable income, available on AMECO database. 
Finally, we apply the usual variable of gross domestic product to describe the evolution 
of output growth. It was collected from the Eurostat (at current prices and in millions of national 
currency) and was deflated using the GDP deflator (2005=100), available on AMECO database. 
After that, we calculate the respective annual growth rate.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
Our methodology involves four steps. Note that we assume the stationarity of our data for the 
following three reasons. First, plots of our eight variables (Figure A1 to Figure A8 in Appendix) 
already seem to indicate that all variables are stationary in levels. Second, our variables are in 
fact defined in ratios (in the case of investment, profitability, debt, savings rate, financial 
receipts and financial payments) or in growth rates (in the case of output growth); intuitively it 
is plausible to assume that these variables do not exhibit a unit root. Third, the traditional panel 
unit root tests have low power and perform very poorly in the presence of panels where the 
cross-sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension T , as recognised by Baltagi 
(2005), Hlouskova and Wagner (2006), Cameron and Trivedi (2009), among others. These 
authors also emphasise that for small T , there is the potential risk of concluding that the whole 
panel in non-stationary even when the panel has a large proportion of stationary data, since the 
conventional panel unit root tests tend to assume that T . 
 Therefore, we must first decide which is the best econometric panel technique to make 
our estimations. There are several analytical models, namely the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(POLS), the Fixed-Effects (FE) and the Ramdom-Effects (RE). We will perform the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test and the Hausman (1978) specification test
8
 to decide 
whether there are individual effects and if these effects are fixed or random. 
 Having done this, we will make some diagnostic tests to determine whether our panel 
suffers from problems such as heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation of the residuals and/or cross-
sectional dependence, because these disturbances are usually present in most macroeconomic 
empirical applications and they tend to affect the performance of panel estimators, as recognised 
by Hoechle (2007), Reed and Ye (2011), among others. We will apply a period 
heteroscedasticity test and a cross-sectional heteroscedasticity test
9
, based on Levene (1960) and 
                                                          
8 We apply, respectively, the “xttest0” and the “hausman” commands from Stata software. 
9 We follow the “robvar” instruction from Stata software.  
 
 Financialisation and real investment in the European Union using a country-level analysis: 
beneficial or prejudicial effects? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
18 
 
Brown and Forsythe (1974). This test reports Levene’s robust test statistic (W0) for the equality 
of variances and the two statistics proposed by Brown and Forsythe (1974) that replace the 
mean in Levene’s formula with the median (W50) and with the 10% trimmed mean (W10) 
because these two reformulations have been proved more robust in the presence of skewed 
populations. We also apply a modified Wald statistic to test a group-wise heteroscedasticity
10
, 
following Greene (2000). In addition, we perform the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial 
correlation
11
. Drukker (2003) emphasises that this test has good size and power properties even 
in reasonably sized samples. Finally, we conduct a cross-sectional dependence test
12
, based on 
three different testing procedures:  Friedman’s (1937) test statistic, the statistic proposed by 
Frees (1995 and 2004) and the cross-sectional dependence test of Pesaran (2004). As noted by 
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), all these three procedures may be suitable if the panel’s cross-
sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension T and the model is static.  
 The third step is the estimation of our model. As we will see in the next Section, our 
panel suffers from heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation of the residuals and cross-sectional 
dependence. Hoechle (2007) notes that three different estimators can be used to deal with this. 
Firstly, he presents the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) proposed by Parks (1967), 
but stresses that it is not feasible if the panel’s period dimension T  is smaller than its cross-
sectional dimension N  and tends to produce unacceptably small standard error estimates. 
Secondly, he introduces the methodology proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) coefficient estimates with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). 
Nevertheless, he recognises that the finite sample properties of the PCSE estimator are quite 
poor when the panel’s cross-sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension T . 
Thirdly, he presents the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator, emphasising that it applies a 
Newey-West type correction to the sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment 
conditions. He states this estimator is suitable for both balanced and unbalanced panels and 
consistent when the panel’s cross-sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension 
T , which is our case. Therefore, we will use this estimator for our investment function13. 
                                                          
10 We use the “xttest3” command from Stata software.  
11 We apply the “xtserial” instruction from Stata software.  
12 As we have a panel where the cross-sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension T , 
we cannot perform the traditional Lagrange Multiplier test, developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and 
following Greene (2000), through the command “xttest2” in Stata software. We therefore use the “xtcsd” 
command from Stata software. 
13 We follow the “xtscc” instruction from Stata software. Note that this estimator performs a POLS with 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.  
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Finally, we analyse the estimations of our investment equation for EU countries and make a 
simple robustness analysis in order to assess whether the results exhibit some sensitivity to other 
specifications, namely distinguishing between receipts and payments of interest and dividends, 
and differentiating between the more and the less financialised countries.  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
First, we need to address the correct model specification to determine whether there are 
individual effects in our panel, i.e. country-specific effects that differentiate each country, are 
not observed and do not change over time. These individual effects can be either fixed or 
random. We apply the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test and the Hausman test and 
the respective results are presented in Table 3. In relation to the LM test, we strongly reject the 
null hypothesis that variances across countries are zero. So we have evidence that there are 
significant differences across countries, i.e. there are individual effects. Regarding the Hausman 
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the RE model is preferable to the FE model. We 
therefore conclude that the RE model is the best econometric specification for our panel. 
 
Table 3 – The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test and the Hausman test 
Test Chi-square P-value  
LM test 990.76 0.000 
Hausman test  4.89 0.674 
 
We then conduct a set of diagnostic tests to assess whether our RE model suffers from any 
disturbance. We apply five different tests and the respective results are presented in Table 4. In 
relation to the period and the cross-sectional heteroscedasticity tests, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the variances are equal (homocedasticity), concluding that our panel suffers 
from heterocedasticity. Note that we cannot perform the group-wise heteroscedasticity test 
because it is not available for the RE models. For the serial correlation test, the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation is clearly rejected and it is concluded that our panel suffers from 
autocorrelation of the residuals. Finally and regarding the cross-sectional dependence, the null 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence cannot be rejected by the Friedman test. However, 
the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is rejected by Frees test and Pesaran test. 
Therefore, we will assume the existence of cross-sectional dependence in our panel as this is the 
result of two of the three tests performed. 
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Table 4 – Diagnostic tests for the RE model 
Test Statistic P-value 
Period  
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
3.071 
2.343 
2.873 
0.000 
0.002 
0.000 
Cross-sectional 
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
8.050 
5.577 
7.311 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Group-wise Heteroscedasticity n. a.  n. a.  
Serial Correlation 46,374 0,000 
Cross-sectional 
Dependence 
Friedman 
Frees 
Pesaran 
25.741 
1.566 
6.778 
0.477 
n. a. 
0.000 
Note: The critical values from Frees’ Q distribution (T-asymptotically distributed) are 0.489, 0.686 and 
1.105 to the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
 
We then proceed with the estimation of our investment function. As our panel suffers from 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation of the respective residuals and cross-sectional dependence, we 
use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator and the respective results are in Table 5. 
All variables are statistically significant at the conventional significance levels, with the 
exception of cost of capital and output growth. Even so, the variable of output growth has the 
expected positive sign, partially confirming that investors are more willing to invest in periods of 
economic growth and that investment is procyclical in relation to the business cycle. However, the 
respective coefficient is less than one, which does not confirm the accelerator principle. On the other 
hand, all coefficients of the statistically significant variables have the expected signals, with the 
exception of savings rate and financial receipts. Indeed, NFCs’ investment is positively influenced 
by the level of profitability, which may suggest that profits are used to finance real investments. 
Alternatively, a higher profitability rate may indicate that future projects will be more profitable and 
thus induces more investment. A 1 p.p. increase in profitability raises investment by about 0.3 p.p.. 
The debt level exerts a negative influence on the NFCs’ investment: a 1 p.p. increase in the level of 
debt reduces real investment by around 0.45 p.p.. This indicates that the debt level of NFCs has 
reached an unsafe level, making it more difficult to obtain further funding. This also suggests that 
debt is being used to repay existing debts rather than to fund new investments. The real investment 
of NFCs also depends negatively on the savings rate: a 1 p.p. increase in the savings rate lowers 
investment by about 0.2 p.p.. This (unexpected) negative coefficient of the savings rate could have 
two different explanations. First, it could indicate that banks in EU countries are not so dependent on 
household savings to guarantee their intermediation function, namely because they have access to 
other forms of financing (e.g. foreign financing). Second, it could be associated simply with the 
negative relationship between savings and consumption. In fact, a higher level of savings involves 
lower consumption by households, which can slow down the new investments made by 
corporations. Financial receipts exert a positive influence on real investment, contrary to the claims 
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of the literature on financialisation. A 1 p.p. rise in financial receipts raises investment by about 0.3 
p.p.. This seems to exclude the “crowding out” assumption. This positive relationship reveals that 
financial investments have not been detrimental to real investments, probably because NFCs use 
financial returns to finance real investments. Finally, real investment is negatively influenced by 
financial payments in line with the literature on financialisation. A 1 p.p. increase in financial 
payments reduces investment by about 0.5 p.p.. 
Table 5 – Estimations of the investment function 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
Pt-1 0.279*** 0.060 4.69 
Dt-1 -0.447*** 0.071 -6.27 
CCt-1 0.109 0.091 1.20 
SRt-1 -0.150* 0.077 -1.95 
OGt-1 0.099 0.076 1.31 
FRt-1 0.252*** 0.049 5.11 
FPt-1 -0.475*** 0.056 -8.47 
β0 0.206*** 0.024 8.75 
Observations: 423; Groups: 27; F-statistic = 191.83***; R2 = 0.554  
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
  
To obtain a better understanding of the effects of financialisation on NFCs’ real investment in 
EU countries, we also re-estimate the investment function equation, splitting financial receipts 
into interest and dividends receipts ( IR  and DR , respectively) and dividing financial payments 
into interest and dividends payments ( IP  and DP , respectively). Once again, the RE model 
proved to be the best econometric specification to estimate the investment function, according to 
the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test and the Hausman test (Table A2 in 
Appendix). We maintain the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator because our investment 
function defined in this particular way continues to suffer from heteroscedasticity, serial 
correlation of the respective residuals and cross-sectional dependence (Table A3 in Appendix). 
The respective results are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Estimations of the investment function with financial receipts and financial payments divided 
between interest and dividends 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
Pt-1 0.296*** 0.056 5.29 
Dt-1 -0.454*** 0.072 -6.30 
CCt-1 0.132 0.080 1.64 
SRt-1 -0.132* 0.070 -1.88 
OGt-1 0.109* 0.059 1.84 
IRt-1 -0.087 0.202 -0.43 
DRt-1 0.395*** 0.077 5.13 
IPt-1 -0.470*** 0.117 -4.02 
DPt-1 -0.507*** 0.059 -8.60 
β0 0.206*** 0.022 9.35 
Observations: 423; Groups: 27; F-statistic = 156.39***; R2 = 0.564 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
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Overall, the results do not change dramatically. In fact, all variables remain statistically 
significant at the traditional significance levels, with the exception of cost of capital. At the 
same time, the level of profitability continues to influence investment positively and the debt 
level and savings rate also exerts a negative influence on NFCs’ real investment. Here, the most 
important change is related with the output growth variable, which becomes statistically 
significant and continues to influence investment positively, reinforcing the procyclical nature 
of investment. Similarly, financial payments continue to exert a negative influence on real 
investment, not only through interest payments but also through dividends. This shows us that 
the debt service and the paradigm of “shareholder value orientation” have been simultaneously 
detrimental to NFCs’ real investment in the EU. Nevertheless, the “shareholder value 
orientation” seems to be more harmful for real investment, given the lower coefficient of 
dividends payments in relation to the coefficient of interest payments. However, we conduct a 
simple Wald test to determine whether the two coefficients are statistically equal (Table A4 in 
Appendix). We cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that they are statistically equal. 
The channel of financial receipts exhibits mixed results. Indeed, interest receipts are a negative 
determinant to real investment but cease to have statistical significance. This seems to give a 
tenuous indication that the returns of financial investments in debt securities are being used to 
finance further financial activities or financial investments, confirming the hypothesis of the 
“crowding out” effect. Nevertheless, dividends receipts remain statistically significant and 
maintain a positive sign, strengthening the claims that NFCs in EU countries could be using 
their financial returns from shares to make new real investments.  
Our next aim is to discover whether financialisation has affected both more 
financialised and less financialised countries in the same manner and/or degree. We re-estimate 
our aggregate investment function, adding two dummy variables for the more financialised 
countries in terms of financial receipts and financial payments ( DFR  and DFP , respectively). 
We calculated the average of financial receipts and financial payments for each country during 
the period for which both variables are available (Table A5 in Appendix). After, we split the 
different countries into those with more and fewer financial receipts and those with more and 
fewer financial payments, respectively, in relation to the overall average of all countries (Table 
A6 in Appendix). The more financialised countries in terms of financial receipts and financial 
payments take the value one in the dummy variables DFR  and DFP , respectively14. These 
                                                          
14 Note that DFR  takes the value 1 for Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. DFP  takes 
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two dummies are then multiplied by the two respective financialisation variables in order to 
determine whether there is a relationship between investment and the extent of the countries’ 
financialisation.    
Here, the FE model seem to be the best econometric specification to estimate our 
investment function defined in this manner, according to the the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier test and the Hausman test ( 
Table A7 in Appendix). However, we maintain the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator 
because our investment function defined in this particular specification continues to suffer from 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation of the respective residuals and cross-sectional dependence 
(Table A8 in Appendix). The respective results are presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 – Estimations of the investment function with two dummies for the countries that exhibit higher 
levels of financial receipts and higher levels of financial payments 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
Pt-1 0.298*** 0.043 6.86 
Dt-1 -0.436*** 0.073 -6.02 
CCt-1 0.109 0.094 1.15 
SRt-1 -0.144* 0.074 -1.95 
OGt-1 0.128 0.092 1.40 
FRt-1 0.358* 0.183 1.95 
DFR*FRt-1 -0.090 0.148 -0.61 
FPt-1 -0.410*** 0.053 -7.70 
DFP*FPt-1 -0.052** 0.019 -2.79 
β0 0.185*** 0.016 11.69 
Observations: 423; Groups: 27; F-statistic = 405.34***; R2 = 0.560 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level 
 
On aggregate, the results are quite similar. Once again, all variables are statistically significant 
at the traditional significance levels with the exception of cost of capital and output growth. In 
the same fashion, the profitability level remains a positive determinant of NFCs’ real 
investment, whilst the debt level and the savings rate maintain their negative influence on real 
investment. The variables linked with financialisation also suffer no significant changes. 
Financial receipts continue to influence real investment positively, strengthening our argument 
that financial investments made by NFCs are not diverting substantial funds from real 
investments. Instead, these financial incomes seem to be used as a source of funding for new 
investment. Financial payments maintain their negative coefficient, confirming that lower 
retention ratios are disruptive for NFCs’ real investment. The most important findings are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the value 1 for Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. 
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related with the dummies variables, which are negative in both cases (albeit statistically 
insignificant in the case of financial receipts). This seems to illustrate that real investment in 
more financialised countries is more adversely affected than in less financialised countries. 
In conclusion, we find evidence supporting the claim that financialisation has hurt 
NFCs’ real investment in EU countries, mainly due to the channel involving the strong 
pressures on NFCs to increase their payments to shareholders in the form of interest and 
dividends. We are also able to identify that the prejudicial effects of financialisation are worse 
in the more financialised countries. Another important conclusion is that there is a disruptive 
relationship between debt and real investment, which suggests that NFCs in EU countries use 
new debts to repay existing debts rather than to implement new productive investments. Our 
results are therefore in line with other empirical studies that find a negative relationship between 
financialisation and real investment (Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; van 
Treeck, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011; and Barradas and Lagoa, 2014) and between debt and real 
investment (Orhangazi, 2008b
15
; Barradas and Lagoa, 2014). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to determine whether financialisation has beneficial or prejudicial effects on 
real investment in EU countries by conducting a panel data econometric analysis for 27 EU 
countries from 1995 and 2013, using macroeconomic annual data. 
As opposed to mainstream economics, the literature on financialisation refers to two 
channels through which the increasing importance of finance could be disruptive to the real 
investment of NFCs. Firstly, the rise of in financial investments made by NFCs deviates funds 
from productive investments, causing a type of “crowding out” effect on real investment. 
Secondly, the funds available to support real investments have decreased due to the strong 
pressure from shareholders on NFCs for financial payments in the form of interest, dividends 
and/or stock buybacks.  
We estimate an investment equation to describe real investment using macroeconomic 
annual data and making use of the standard variables (profitability, debt, cost of capital, savings 
rate and output growth) and two other variables to reflect the two channels of financialisation 
(financial receipts and financial payments).  
We conclude that the RE model is the best econometric specification and that our panel 
suffers from heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation of the residuals and cross-sectional dependence. 
                                                          
15 Orhangazi (2008a) finds that debt has a positive influence on real investment, but lacks statistical 
significance at the traditional significance levels.  
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Therefore, we estimated our investment equation using the Driscoll and Kraay estimator. We 
identified financial payments as a negative determinant of real investment in EU countries, in 
accordance with the predictions of the literature on financialisation. Both interest and dividend 
payments negatively influence real investment. Nevertheless, financial receipts of dividends 
exert a positive impact on real investment, in contradiction with the literature on 
financialisation. This seems to illustrate that NFCs in EU countries are using financial incomes 
to fund real investments, which excludes the “crowding effect”. We also conclude that the 
prejudicial effects of the financialisation on real investment are worse in the more financialised 
countries. This reveals that there is a tendency for the investment rate of a country to be 
(inversely) related with the degree of financialisation. Future research should extend the 
analysis to sustain the validity of this assumption, namely through the use of other broader and 
more complex indicators to distinguish between more and less financialised countries. We also 
find that debt exerts a negative influence on real investment, which suggests that the NFCs’ 
indebtedness reaches unsafe levels by limiting the possibility to obtain further funding to 
finance productive investments. Another possible extension of this work is the use of different 
measures to capture the two channels of financialisation. The proportion of financial assets to 
total assets of NFCs and the level of payout ratios of NFCs appear to be two interesting 
alternatives.  
The use of an aggregate investment function to assess the behaviour of NFCs, which is 
supported by microeconomic fundaments, has the advantage of understanding if the 
financialisation process has prejudicial macroeconomic effects in EU countries. However, this 
approach introduces some limitations on the respective analysis, since we are unable to identify 
whether these prejudicial effects are due to the impact of some corporations/countries or a 
generalised phenomenon across the majority of corporations from different 
sectors/industries/countries and with different dimension and ownership. It would be interesting 
to extend this work using micro databases at a corporation-level or industry-level. 
Our findings suggest that the prejudicial effects of financialisation on real investment 
are not peculiar to the most developed and financialised economies, such as USA and UK. 
Instead, it seems to be a generalised phenomenon that negatively affects most EU countries, 
albeit with different intensities in accordance with the level of financialisation. 
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8. APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1 – The descriptive statistics of the data 
 I P D CC SR OG FR FP 
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Mean 0.246 0.427 -0.019 0.026 0.096 0.025 0.090 0.212 
Median 0.238 0.414 -0.013 0.025 0.105 0.028 0.066 0.205 
Maximum 0.512 0.603 0.250 0.245 0.211 0.140 0.637 0.708 
Minimum 0.041 0.280 -0.447 -0.232 -0.202 -0.150 0.001 0.043 
Standard Deviation 0.070 0.074 0.092 0.039 0.066 0.036 0.083 0.091 
Skewness 0.769 0.278 -0.502 0.325 -1.282 -0.907 2.509 1.264 
Kurtosis 3.516 2.274 4.467 13.413 5.090 6.662 12.715 6.708 
 
 
 
Figure A1 – The plots of investment (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A2 – The plots of profitability (% of gross value added) 
 
Figure A3 – The plots of debt (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A4 – The plots of cost of capital (%) 
 
Figure A5 – The plots of savings rate (% of disposable income) 
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Figure A6 – The plots of output growth (annual growth rate) 
 
Figure A7 – The plots of financial receipts (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A8 – The plots of financial payments (% of gross value added) 
 
 
Table A2 – The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test and the Hausman test for the 
investment function with financial receipts and financial payments divided between interest and dividends 
Test Chi-square P-value  
LM test 931.08 0.000 
Hausman test  6.42 0.697 
 
 
Table A3 – Diagnostic tests for the investment function with financial receipts and financial payments 
divided between interest and dividends 
Test Statistic P-value 
Period  
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
2.743 
2.170 
2.549 
0.000 
0.005 
0.001 
Cross-sectional 
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
7.748 
5.412 
7.102 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Group-wise Heteroscedasticity n. a. n. a.  
Serial Correlation 46.357 0.000 
Cross-sectional 
Dependence 
Friedman 
Frees 
Pesaran 
24.741 
1.552 
7.090 
0.534 
n. a. 
0.000 
Note: The critical values from Frees’ Q distribution (T-asymptotically distributed) are 0.489, 0.686 and 
1.105 to the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A4 – The Wald test on the equality of interest payments and dividends payments 
Null hypothesis T-statistic P-value 
IPt-1 = DPt-1 0.09 0.773 
 
Table A5 – The average of financial receipts and financial payments per country 
Country FR FP 
Austria 0.074 0.199 
Belgium 0.170 0.261 
Bulgaria  0.021 0.097 
Cyprus 0.146 0.274 
Czech Republic  0.035 0.172 
Denmark 0.145 0.181 
Estonia 0.033 0.108 
Finland 0.105 0.215 
France 0.180 0.272 
Germany  0.061 0.257 
Greece  0.034 0.213 
Hungary 0.103 0.203 
Ireland 0.035 0.257 
Italy 0.050 0.278 
Latvia 0.047 0.225 
Lithuania 0.013 0.303 
Luxembourg 0.458 0.558 
Netherlands 0.107 0.164 
Norway 0.108 0.273 
Poland 0.029 0.137 
Portugal 0.075 0.211 
Romania 0.041 0.124 
Slovakia 0.039 0.142 
Slovenia 0.036 0.083 
Spain 0.054 0.154 
Sweden 0.258 0.337 
United Kingdom 0.080 0.203 
All Countries 0.090 0.212 
 
 
Table A6 – The distribution between the more and the less financialised countries 
FR FP 
More  Less More Less 
Belgium Austria Belgium Austria 
Cyprus Bulgaria Cyprus Bulgaria 
Denmark Czech Republic Finland Czech Republic 
Finland Estonia France Denmark 
France Germany Germany Estonia 
Hungary Greece Greece Hungary 
Luxembourg Ireland Ireland Netherlands 
Netherlands Italy Italy Poland 
Norway Latvia Latvia Portugal  
Sweden  Lithuania Lithuania Romania 
 Poland Luxembourg Slovakia 
 Portugal Norway Slovenia 
 Romania  Sweden  Spain 
 Slovakia  United Kingdom 
 Slovenia    
 Spain    
 United Kingdom   
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Table A7 – The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test and the Hausman test for the 
investment function with two dummies for the more financialised countries 
Test Chi-square P-value  
LM test 936.65 0.000 
Hausman test  40.44 0.000 
 
 
 
 
Table A8 – Diagnostic tests for the investment function with two dummies for the more financialised 
countries 
Test Statistic P-value 
Period  
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
1.619 
1.550 
1.606 
0.056 
0.074 
0.059 
Cross-sectional 
Heteroscedasticity 
W0 
W50 
W10 
9.559 
5.582 
8.582 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Group-wise Heteroscedasticity 446.38 0.000 
Serial Correlation 44.617 0.000 
Cross-sectional 
Dependence 
Friedman 
Frees 
Pesaran 
33.593 
1.609 
8.584 
0.146 
n. a. 
0.000 
Note: The critical values from Frees’ Q distribution (T-asymptotically distributed) are 0.489, 0.686 and 
1.105 to the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
 
 
 
